Procedure: Civil Procedure by L\u27Enfant, Howard W., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 35 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1975
Procedure: Civil Procedure
Howard W. L'Enfant Jr.
Louisiana State University Law Center
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Howard W. L'Enfant Jr., Procedure: Civil Procedure, 35 La. L. Rev. (1975)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol35/iss2/24
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.
JURISDICTION-ALIMONY
In Imperial v. Hardy,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held
it had no jurisdiction to render a judgment against a non-resident
father for past due child support and to increase the amount of sup-
port for the future. The parties had been divorced in Michigan in 1965
by a judgment which granted the mother custody of the children and
ordered the father to pay child support. Two years later, while the
children were living with their mother in Louisiana, the Michigan
court ordered the father, who was then living in Illinois, to pay the
support payments which were in arrears and increased the amount
of future support. The court also rendered a money judgment for the
past due payments so that it could be executed in another state. In
1968, the father sued in Louisiana to obtain custody and the mother
reconvened to make the Michigan judgment executory. By agree-
ment, a judgment was entered continuing custody in the mother,
establishing visitation rights for the father, fixing support payments
in the same amount ordered by the Michigan judgment and making
the Michigan money judgment executory. In 1973, the mother insti-
tuted the present action to increase child support and to obtain an
executory judgment for past due child support.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the plaintiff argued that the defen-
dant had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court
in the 1968 action to determine custody and that the Louisiana court
has continuing jurisdiction to determine the issues of increased child
support and past due payments. The court agreed that ordinarily the
court which renders an order for child support incidental to a judg-
ment of divorce continues to have jurisdiction to modify or enforce
the order, but refused to follow that principle in this case. The major-
ity reasoned that in the 1968 proceeding the Louisiana court had
simply recognized a Michigan judgment rendered in a Michigan di-
vorce proceeding and noted that applying the continuing jurisdiction
principle in this kind of case would enable a mother who wanted to
increase support payments to simply deny the father his visitation
rights, thereby forcing him to submit to the jurisdiction of a court
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. 287 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 302 So. 2d 5 (La. 1974).
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which otherwise would have no basis for asserting authority over him.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
1968 proceeding and contended that the father petitioned for a
change of custody based on the living conditions of the children in
Louisiana and that therefore the judgment was not simply a recogni-
tion of the Michigan judgment. The Louisiana court had jurisdiction
over the issue of custody because the children were living in Louisiana
and the question of child support was ancillary to the matter of cus-
tody. Both matters-custody and child support-are subject to modi-
fication and, as long as the children remain here, Louisiana courts
have the obligation of insuring their best interests; therefore, they
must have the power to provide for the support of the children by
enforcing the obligation of the father to care for them. The dissent
concluded that the court had jurisdiction in this case based on its
jurisdiction over status-the question of custody-and because of the
general appearance of the father in the prior action.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed with the prin-
ciple that there is continuing jurisdiction over issues of child support
and custody but disagreed as to whether it should be applied in
Imperial. The majority apparently would have been willing to apply
it if a Louisiana divorce had been involved. The principle was applied
in a later Fourth Circuit case, Anthony v. Anthony,2 where the wife
obtained in Louisiana a divorce and custody of the children from her
husband who was a non-resident at the time of the divorce. The
divorce decree continued the alimony awarded in the separation pro-
ceeding, in which the husband had been served with process. Two
months later, the wife moved for a judgment for past due alimony and
the husband, through an attorney appointed to represent him, ob-
jected that the court had no jurisdiction over him. The court held
there was jurisdiction because the proceeding was simply to deter-
mine how much was due under the old judgment and not a proceed-
ing for a new judgment; therefore, the jurisdiction for the original
judgment also supported the second proceeding.
But other courts have reached different conclusions. In Smith v.
Smith,3 the wife instituted an action to obtain an executory money
judgment for arrearages in alimony and child support payments and
served process on the attorneys who had represented the defendant
husband (a non-resident at the time of that action) in the original
divorce proceeding. The First Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that the
2. 288 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
3. 289 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). An earlier attempt to assert jurisdiction
had also been unsuccessful. Smith v. Smith, 257 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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action for a money judgment for past due alimony and support pay-
ments was not an action incidental to the divorce proceeding and
service on the former attorneys was invalid. The action was therefore
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. This decision
was cited in Anthony v. Anthony and expressly rejected. In so doing,
the court in Anthony relied on a 1947 Louisiana supreme court case,
Williams v. Williams,4 in which the court stated that an action to
obtain past due child support payments was not an action to obtain
a money judgment but a procedure to implement the prior judgment
determining the amount of child support owed by the father. Al-
though this language seems to support the conclusions of the court
in Anthony on the question of jurisdiction, i.e., that the second pro-
ceeding is simply a continuation of the original proceeding and not a
new action, the issue in Williams was a procedural one-whether the
wife could use a summary proceeding to obtain an executory judg-
ment-and not a question of jurisdiction over the defendant.
The Louisiana supreme court granted writs in Imperial v. Hardy
and reversed.5 The majority reasoned that service of process on defen-
dant's prior attorney of record was proper6 if the court had jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, and also if there were jurisdiction, the court
could appoint an attorney to represent the defendant.' On the issue
of jurisdiction, the court stated that there must be personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant for a money judgment for alimony,8 that
jurisdiction over the status of the children was not enough, but con-
cluded that there was jurisdiction because the defendant had submit-
ted to the court's jurisdiction in the 1968 proceeding in which he had
sought custody and in which the wife had raised the issue of child
support through her reconventional demand. To bolster its decision
on jurisdiction, the court further reasoned that jurisdiction is power
and that it would be meaningless if the court which ordered child
support could neither modify nor enforce its decree. Therefore, once
jurisdiction attached for an award of child support it continued for
enforcement or modification of the award.
The dissenting justices tended to agree with the majority that
the court which rendered the original decree retains personal jurisdic-
tion to modify that decree and cited two cases' which allowed a Louis-
4. 211 La. 939, 31 So. 2d 170 (1947).
5. 287 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 302 So. 2d 5 (La. 1974).
6. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1312-14.
7. See art. 5091.
8. See, e.g., Baker v. Jewell, 114 La. 726, 38 So. 532 (1905); de Lavergne v. de
Lavergne, 244 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
9. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 240 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Dupre v. Guil-
lory, 216 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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iana husband to obtain a reduction in the amount of alimony origi-
nally awarded to his non-resident wife. But they felt that an action
to increase the amount might require a different rule. On the issue
of rendering an executory judgment, the dissent concluded that there
was no continuing jurisdiction-submission to jurisdiction on the
question of rate of alimony did not carry with it submission to the
further jurisdiction of the court to render an executory judgment as
to the amount of past due payments. The dissent also disagreed that,
assuming jurisdiction, service could be made on the attorney who had
represented the defendant in the original proceeding because the
judgment awarding alimony is in the nature of a final judgment, and
normally, the attorney's services would then end; therefore, it would
be a fiction to consider the relationship as continuing beyond that
point. The dissent concluded that a proceeding to increase or de-
crease the amount of alimony awarded or to obtain an executory
money judgment for past due alimony is a new proceeding and is not
supported by the jurisdiction obtained in the original proceeding.
As a result of Imperial, if a Louisiana court has personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties'0 to render a judgment for child support, it will
retain jurisdiction to modify the award or to enter a money judgment
for past due payments even if the defendant is a non-resident at the
time of the second proceeding. It is clear that a judgment for child
support requires personal jurisdiction" and so, as in other cases in-
volving jurisdiction over non-residents, it is necessary to determine
whether the assertion of jurisdiction under those circumstances is
fair."2 The defendant will argue that it is unfair to require him to
return to Louisiana to contest the question of liability for past due
payments or of a modification of the award. But on the other hand,
the Louisiana court will have jurisdiction over the children because
they live in Louisiana and since the award of child support is clearly
related to the court's general concern for the welfare of the children,
it is appropriate that the courts have the power to not only determine
the amount of child support but also to render executory judgments
for unpaid support. In short, the Louisiana court is in a better posi-
tion to determine the question and, on balance, it is better to require
the non-resident to return to Louisiana than to require the spouse
with custody to travel to the defendant's state.'3 Even if the non-
10. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 6.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. In many instances the parent with custody is unable to travel to defendant's
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resident fails to appear and has no property in the state, the decision
in Imperial, by upholding jurisdiction in Louisiana, makes it possible
for the Louisiana judgment to be enforced under full faith and credit
wherever the defendant has assets." On the issue of notice, it would
be better to have the court appoint an attorney to represent the non-
resident defendant. This could be done because the court would have
jurisdiction over the defendant'5 and it would avoid the issue of
whether the defendant's former attorney still represented him-a
question on which the court in Imperial was sharply divided.
APPEALS-ALIMONY AND CUSTODY
In Malone v. Malone,'" the ex-husband petitioned the court to
terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife and, in a separate suit,
she petitioned for a judgment for past due payments. The cases were
consolidated for trial and in separate judgments the court dismissed
the husband's action and rendered a judgment in favor of the wife for
past due alimony. The husband appealed from both judgments, filing
the appeal bond on the thirty-sixth day after delays for an appeal had
begun to run. Although the appeal would have been timely under the
general ninety-day period for perfecting an appeal,'7 the First Circuit
Court of Appeal, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal as untimely
under article 394318 which allows thirty days for taking an appeal
from a judgment awarding custody or alimony. The appellant argued
that this was a judgment refusing to terminate alimony and not a
judgment awarding alimony and therefore article 3943 was not appli-
cable. The court, however, concluded that a judgment refusing to
terminate alimony was the same as a judgment awarding alimony
and was governed by article 3943.
state and the support decree is thus not enforced. Although the majority in the Fourth
Circuit decision pointed to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, LA.
R.S. 13:1641-99 (Supp. 1966), as a possible solution to the wife's problem, the absence
of cases applying this statute indicates that it is not considered an effective remedy.
14. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944);
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77
(1969).
15. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 5091.
16. 265 So. 2d 255 & 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), aff'd, 282 So. 2d 119 (La. 1973).
17. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2087.
18. Id. art. 3943 provides: "An appeal from a judgment awarding custody of a
person or alimony can be taken only within the delay provided in Article 3942. Such
an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the judgment in so far as the judgment
relates to custody or alimony." Article 3942 requires the appeal to be taken within
thirty days from the applicable date provided in article 2087.
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The Louisiana supreme court granted writs to review the dis-
missal of the appeal from the judgment refusing to terminate alimony
and affirmed."9 As the court noted, the language in the article is
unfortunate and has resulted in confusion in its application: "judg-
ment awarding" seems to be restrictive, while the language in the
next sentence, "judgment relates to," indicates a broader applica-
tion. While there has been a uniform application of the article to
judgments awarding custody and alimony,2" courts have been divided
when the action was to terminate alimony or custody. Most applied
article 3943,21 but some have ruled that judgments which either ter-
minate or deny alimony or custody are not governed by article 3943.11
The court in Malone, reasoning that the legislature must have in-
tended uniform treatment for all judgments pertaining to custody or
alimony and that there are strong policy reasons for expediting ap-
peals in these cases, ruled "that appeals from judgments awarding,
denying, modifying or terminating alimony or custody are governed
by the provisions of C.C.P. 3943." '
The court could have reached the same decision on narrower
grounds; it could have held that a judgment refusing to terminate
alimony is the same as a judgment awarding alimony and therefore
controlled by the literal language of article 3943-"judgment award-
ing . . . alimony." Instead, the court interpreted the article as apply-
ing to all judgments affecting alimony-awarding, denying, modify-
ing or terminating. The clear effect of this decision is to overrule King
v. King, ' a case in which the First Circuit read article 3943 literally
and held that it did not apply to a judgment terminating alimony.
What is not as clear is whether article 3943 now also applies to a
judgment for past due alimony. In Granger v. Granger,"2 the Third
Circuit held that a motion to have the amount of past due alimony
determined and made executory under article 3943 is not a "judg-
19. Writ granted, 262 La. 1168, 266 So. 2d 447 (1972), aff'd, 282 So. 2d 119 (La.
1973).
20. See, e.g., Wood v. Beard, 268 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Kinnaird v.
Kinnaird, 260 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Benoit v. Blassingame, 249 So. 2d
302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
21. See, e.g., Picinich v. Picinich, 271 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Crum
v. Crum, 261 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); McNeill v. McNeill, 257 So. 2d 767
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
22. King v. King, 253 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), writ denied, 260 La.
128, 255 So. 2d 353 (1971) (interpretation of article 3943 not assigned as error in
application for review); Derussy v. Derussy, 173 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
23. 282 So. 2d 119, 121 (La. 1973).
24. 253 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
25. 193 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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ment awarding alimony" and is therefore not controlled by article
3943. A similar result was reached by the First Circuit in Picinich v.
Picinich," in which the court held that article 3943 did not apply to
that portion of the judgment awarding past due alimony but did
govern the portion of the judgment rejecting the request to decrease
alimony payments in the future. In Malone, the court of appeal dis-
missed the appeal with respect to termination of alimony as untimely
but decided the other appeal on the merits. 7 Since both judgments
were rendered on the same day and the defendant apparently took
an appeal from both at the same time, the different results indicate
that the court did not apply article 3943 to the judgment for past due
alimony. The Louisiana supreme court did not grant writs to review
this judgment and it is unclear whether article 3943 should be consid-
ered applicable to these judgments as well. To apply article 3943
would be in accord with the legislative intent to have appeals from
all judgments respecting alimony handled expeditiously, but there
are cases to the contrary and a firm answer cannot be given at pres-
ent.
Another aspect of article 3943 deserves comment in the light of
Malone and that is the provision prohibiting suspensive appeals from
judgments relating to custody and alimony. As the comments to the
article make clear, the purpose was to codify the case law prohibiting
suspensive appeals from judgments in custody matters and also to
legislatively overrule cases allowing suspensive appeals from alimony
judgments in order to prevent the wife from being deprived of support
pending appeal. " In Derussy v. Derussy," the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal sought to carry out the intent by holding that article 3943
only applied to judgments awarding alimony and therefore the wife
could take a suspensive appeal from a judgment terminating ali-
mony. A similar result was reached in Pattison v. Pattison" where the
court allowed a suspensive appeal from a judgment suspending ali-
mony payments. The supreme court in Malone was not concerned
with the suspensive appeal provision in article 3943, but it did cite
Derussy (along with King) as one of the cases holding article 3943
inapplicable in an alimony case. It might be that this fact, coupled
26. 271 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
27. 265 So. 2d 258 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1972).
28. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3943, comment (a): "This article codifies the jurispru-
dence denying a suspensive appeal in custody cases .... However, it overturns the
line of cases holding that a suspensive appeal may be taken from an alimony judgment
.... Thus the wife will no longer be deprived of necessary support pending appeal."
29. 173 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
30. 196 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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with the language concerning the intent of the legislature that there
should be uniform treatment of judgments relating to alimony,
means that Malone should be read as disapproving of Derussy. Al-
though this is a supportable position, the better view would be to
interpret Malone as requiring that article 3943 be applied uniformly
on the time for taking an appeal, but not requiring uniform applica-
tion on the question of suspensive appeals because the intent of the
legislature to protect the wife from loss of support pending an appeal
requires a distinction between judgments awarding alimony and
judgments suspending or denying alimony.
APPEALS-CITY COURTS
Under article 5002 of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal from
a judgment rendered in a city court must be taken within ten days
after either the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial or
the denial of a new trial. The delay for applying for a new trial is three
days from the date of the judgment or from service of the notice of
judgment, which need only be given when there has been no personal
service on the defendant and he has failed to answer." In Sublet v.
United T. V. Rental, Inc.,32 the judgment was signed on March 23,
1972 and the plaintiff's motion for an appeal was signed on April 11,
1972. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, on its own motion, dis-
missed the appeal as untimely. In defense of his appeal the appellant
argued that it was the custom of the clerk to mail notices of the
judgment, that notice of the judgment did not reach him until April
10, and that his appeal should not be dismissed because he was
entitled to rely on this custom. In support of his position, the appel-
lant cited Reid v. Blanke,3  an earlier Fourth Circuit case, where the
court allowed an otherwise untimely appeal because the appellant
had relied upon the custom of the clerk to mail notice of the signing
of the judgment and there had been a delay in the mailing of this
notice. The majority in Sublet rejected the appellant's argument and
expressly overruled Reid on the grounds that custom cannot prevail
over the express provisions of the Code, 34 that notice is not required
and therefore delays in giving notice cannot affect the requirements
for perfecting an appeal.
Because the case involved overruling a prior decision of that
31. LA. CODE CIv. P. art 4898.
32. 284 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
33. 215 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
34. The majority cited LA. CIv. CODE art. 21.
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circuit it was decided en banc, and there were three separate dissent-
ing opinions disagreeing with the majority on the issue of the effect
of custom and also raising the issue of due process. On the question
of custom, the dissent contended that Reid had been correctly de-
cided and found support for this position in the Louisiana supreme
court case of Messina v. Kock Industries.35 There an applicant for
certiorari had filed his petition on the last day by leaving it at the
home of the deputy clerk of court because he could not make it to
New Orleans before the clerk's office closed for the day. The court
rules required filing in the office of the clerk of court and the oppo-
nent moved to vacate the order granting the writ because the petition
had not been timely filed. But the court found that it was the custom
of the clerk and his deputies to receive documents for filing at places
other than at the clerk's office and that attorneys had relied on this
custom. The court concluded that it would be a great disservice to
the attorneys to suddenly depart from this long established practice
and upheld the granting of the writ. Messina and Sublet could be
distinguished on the grounds that in the former, custom involved an
interpretation of court rules 3-what is meant by filing "in the office
of the clerk"-whereas in Sublet the custom of giving notice was
contrary to the express legislation that no notice was required. But
the cases are similar in that the attorneys in each case relied on the
established practice of the clerk's office. Moreover, the practice in
Sublet had been approved by the court of appeal in Reid, and the
supreme court in Messina had recognized the unfairness of departing
from the custom without prior notice of its abolition. The dissent
concluded it would have been fairer for the court in Sublet to allow
the appeal, especially since appeals are strongly favored,37 and to
overrule Reid and the custom prospectively, thereby giving adequate
notice of the change. Other dissenting judges challenged on due pro-
cess grounds the code articles"8 providing that no notice was required,
as a denial, in effect, of the right to an appeal. These judges argued
that the statute which provides that an appeal must be taken within
a certain period of time must also provide a reasonable procedure for
giving notice of the event which begins running of the time for taking
an appeal.
35. 273 So. 2d 725 (La. 1973).
36. LA. SuP. CT. R. XII.
37. See, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Baillio, 252 La. 181, 210 So.2d 312 (1968);
Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v. Campbell, 250 La. 868, 199 So. 2d 904 (1967); Emmons v.
Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963); King v. King, 253 So. 2d 660
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
38. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 4898, 5002.
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Although it is doubtful that the code articles in question are
unconstitutional, the better rule would be to provide for notice of the
signing of the judgment as is done in district courts ," The aim of the
present provisions is to provide a more expeditious appellate proce-
dure for cases tried in city courts, but not at the expense of the
important right of appeal. The appellant has only ten days in which
to take his appeal and because of this short period he should have the
benefit of adequate notice. This is a question for the legislature and
it is hoped that they will act promptly to provide greater protection
for the appellant.
CREDITOR'S REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
In Fuentes v. Shevin,15 the United States Supreme Court struck
down the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania as repugnant
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because,
under these statutes, a creditor could seize property in the possession
of his debtor without first giving the debtor notice and an opportunity
to challenge the creditor's claim to the property. This decision
brought the requirements of procedural due process-prior notice and
opportunity to be heard-to bear on the traditional creditor's remedy
of replevin in such sweeping terms that it raised doubts as to the
continued validity of other statutes which, like replevin, allowed
property to be seized without prior notice and a hearing. The impact
of Fuentes was soon felt in Louisiana in two cases which challenged
the constitutionality of the writ of sequestration and of executory
process.
In the first case, W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell," the creditor filed
suit in the First City Court of New Orleans to collect the unpaid
balance on the sale of household appliances to the defendant. In its
petition and supporting affidavit the plaintiff alleged that it had a
vendor's lien on the property and had reason to fear that the defen-
dant would encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of the property
and that a writ of sequestration was therefore necessary.42 The judge
39. Id. arts. 1913, 1914, 1974.
40. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This case is discussed in Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes
v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Louisiana Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV.
62 (1972); Comment, 47 TUL. L. Ray. 806 (1973); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Civil Procedure, 34 LA. L. Rav. 379, 392 (1974).
41. 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972). This case is discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Civil Procedure, 34 LA. L. REv.
379, 392 (1974).
42. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3501, 3571.
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signed the order for the writ on the basis of the petition and affidavit
and on the condition that the plaintiff furnish a bond.43 The defen-
dant moved to dissolve the writ on the grounds that the property was
exempt from seizure under state law" and that the seizure violated
the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. These
objections were overruled by the trial court, court of appeal and by
the Louisiana supreme court. 5 The United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari" and affirmed the constitutionality of
Louisiana's writ of sequestration."
The majority, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice White, recog-
nized that both the debtor and the creditor had real interests in the
property-the debtor had possession and title but the creditor had a
lien on the property and, as a result, the debtor's right to possession
and title were subject to defeasance in the event of default in the
payment of the purchase price. Accordingly, the resolution of the due
process question had to take account of both interests and the major-
ity concluded that Louisiana's sequestration procedure achieved a
constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of creditor
and debtor. From the creditor's point of view, the continued posses-
sion and use of the property by the debtor would necessarily lessen
its resale value and, accordingly, its value as security. Ordinarily, this
condition is offset by the debtor's payments which reduce the amount
of the debt secured by the property. But when the debtor ceases to
make payments, the creditor loses his protection against further de-
cline in the value of his security. It is appropriate, the Court rea-
soned, for the state to recognize this economic reality by providing a
method whereby the creditor can receive protection through dispos-
sessing the debtor. From the debtor's point of view, he loses posses-
sion of the property but is protected from a wrongful seizure through
recourse against the creditor's bond for damages, including attorney's
fees.4" This is fair, reasoned the Court, because the creditor is pre-
pared to compensate the debtor for a wrongful dispossession, but the
debtor is not prepared to compensate the creditor if his continued
possession, contingent on payment of the price, is unjustified. There
is also the real risk that the debtor with control over the property will
conceal or transfer it thereby endangering the creditor's lien which
43. Id. art. 3574.
44. LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1960), as amended.
45. 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
46. 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
47. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
48. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3506.
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requires continued possession in the debtor.49 The only adequate pro-
tection against this danger is dispossession without prior notice, be-
cause such notice could serve as a warning to a bad faith debtor.
The Court was further convinced of the fairness of the sequestra-
tion procedure because not only were there strong reasons for dispos-
sessing the debtor at the outset, but also because the statutory
scheme reduced the risks of a wrongful seizure. The issue at this stage
in the proceeding is whether the creditor is entitled to temporarily
deprive the debtor of the property and this depends on the existence
of the debt, the lien, and the debtor's default, matters which lend
themselves to documentary proof and justify seizure based on the ex
parte presentation of those documents to a judge. Moreover, the
debtor is able to have a full hearing on the issue of possession by filing
a motion to dissolve the writ of sequestration immediately after sei-
zureA0 The majority concluded that Louisiana's sequestration proce-
dure was therefore in accord with the requirements of procedural due
process.
Since the attack on the constitutionality of sequestration was
based primarily on Fuentes v. Shevin, does the decision in Mitchell
mean that Fuentes has, in fact, been overruled? On this question
the Court was divided. Mr. Justice White (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rhenquist) declared that Fuentes
was distinguishable on factual and legal grounds and did not require
the invalidation of the Louisiana sequestration statute. Mr. Justice
Powell concurred in upholding the statute but joined the four dissen-
ters (Justices Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and Brennan) in arguing
that Fuentes had been overruled.
The attempt to distinguish Mitchell from Fuentes was based on
several differences between the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
procedures and Louisiana's sequestration statute. The replevin sta-
tutes authorized the issuance of the writ by a court clerk upon the
bare assertion of the creditor that he was entitled to it." Under the
Florida statute, the debtor would have a hearing at the trial of the
creditor's action for repossession and, in Pennsylvania, the hearing
would come only if the debtor instituted a suit to recover the goods.5"
By contrast, the Louisiana statute authorized the issuance of the writ
only when the grounds for it were shown by specific facts set out in
49. Id. art. 3227.
50. Id. art. 3506.
51. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73 (1972).
52. Id.
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the creditor's petition or affidavit. 3 Further, in the parish where the
Mitchell case arose, the showing must be made before a judge,5 thus
insuring judicial control over the proceedings. Such control mini-
mized the risk of wrongful dispossession so that the debtor was "not
at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries." 5
Another basis for distinction was that the issues in a sequestration
proceeding (existence of the lien and default) were narrower than the
wrongful detention issue in replevin and better suited to documen-
tary proof in an ex parte proceeding.
The dissent claimed that the differences in the replevin and
sequestration procedures were insufficient to distinguish Mitchell
from Fuentes. Fuentes had held the replevin statutes unconstitu-
tional because they allowed a debtor to be temporarily dispossessed
of his property without notice or hearing; the Louisiana procedure
authorized the same result. Although the Louisiana statute requires
more specific information, it was still an ex parte proceeding and,
according to Fuentes, an inadequate substitute for a prior hearing
because it only tests the strength of the creditor's belief in his own
case. The fact that the order is signed by a judge instead of a clerk is
unimportant because either official can only determine the formal
sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations concerning the existence of
the debt, the lien and the debtor's default and the issuance of the writ
thereafter is simply a ministerial act. The majority's reasoning that
the wrongful detention issue in Fuentes was not suited to an ex parte
determination whereas the issues in Mitchell were appropriate for
such a proceeding was rejected by the dissent because the issues were,
in fact, the same, i.e., the creditor's security interest in the property
and the debtor's default. Moreover, Fuentes had declared that the
relative complexity of the issues may affect the formality or schedul-
ing of a prior hearing but could not alter the debtor's right to a prior
hearing. Nor did that right depend upon an advance showing that the
debtor would be successful at the hearing. "It is enough to invoke the
procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a signifi-
cant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of
a hearing on the contractual right to continued possession and use of
the goods.""
Although the Court chose to speak of Fuentes and Mitchell as
distinguishable cases, it seems more accurate to say that Mitchell
53. LA. CoDE Cw. P. art. 3501.
54. Id. art. 281.
55. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1904 (1974).
56. 407 U.S. at 87.
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marks a considerable departure from Fuentes. In Fuentes, the Court
looked at the question from the point of view of the debtor's interest
in the property and concluded that he could be deprived of his posses-
sion, even temporarily, only after prior notice and hearing. Mitchell
declares that the requirements of due process are satisfied by a proper
accommodation of the rights of the creditor and the debtor in the
property. According to Mitchell, procedural due process is satisfied
if state law requires the creditor to furnish adequate security, make
a specific factual showing before a judicial officer that he is entitled
to the relief sought and provides an opportunity for an adversary
hearing promptly after seizure to determine the creditor's right to
seize the property." As a result of this decision, many of the statutes
that seemed in jeopardy under Fuentes will probably be able to sur-
vive a due process challenge, but both decisions were rendered by a
closely divided Court and it may take more cases before the impact
of the requirements of procedural due process on creditors' remedies
is known. For Louisiana creditors, although Mitchell upheld seques-
tration, there is still an area of uncertainty in the future use of the
statute. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the statute
required the order to be signed by a judge. Such procedure is pre-
scribed for Orleans Parish, but in other parishes the order can be
signed by the clerk,58 thus bringing the procedure closer to that in
Fuentes. Although sequestration outside of Orleans Parish would
probably not be invalidated for this reason alone, prudent creditors
should avoid the problem by having the order signed by the judge.
In the second case, Buckner v. Carmack,5 ' the defendant in an
executory proceeding challenged the constitutionality of the proce-
dure as a denial of due process relying primarily on the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the requirements of procedural due
process in Fuentes v. Shevin.6 0 The Louisiana supreme court rejected
defendant's position, reasoning that executory process was distin-
guishable from replevin because the writ would issue only after a
judge was satisfied from the authentic evidence presented that the
creditor was entitled to it. Moreover, since the case involved immova-
ble property, the seizure would be constructive"' and the debtor would
57. At the adversary hearing the creditor will bear the burden of proof. 94 S. Ct.
at 1909.
58. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 282, 283.
59. 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Civil Procedure, 34 LA. L. Rxv. 379, 393 (1974).
60. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
61. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 326; LA. R.S. 13:3853-55 (Supp. 1960).
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receive notice"2 and have at least thirty days63 to challenge the credi-
tor's claim to the property before the property could be sold. The
majority was also satisfied that the debtor had waived his right to a
prior adversary hearing through the confession of judgment. The de-
cision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and on May
28, 1974, almost two weeks after its decision in Mitchell, the court
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question."4
Although the court made no reference to Mitchell, the timing of the
decision makes it reasonable to conclude that, judged by the constitu-
tional standard set forth on Mitchell, there is no substantial federal
question as to the constitutionality of executory process.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
Louisiana's executory proceeding is a simple, quick and inexpen-
sive in rem procedure65 through which a creditor may seize and sell
property encumbered with a mortgage or privilege without first ob-
taining a judgment on the debt. However, to protect the debtor, the
law insists that the creditor strictly comply with the requirements for
an executory proceeding, i.e., that the right to use the remedy must
be based on authentic evidence or its statutory equivalent. 7 It is well
settled that if these requirements are not met the debtor may prevent
the sale through an injunction or suspensive appeal. If the debtor
fails to prevent the sale, he may subsequently bring a direct action
to annul the sale on the grounds of fraud or lack of notice if the
property remains in the hands of the creditor-adjudicatee11 These
decisions seem fair because of the debtor's inability to raise the defen-
ses before sale. But on the broader question of whether a debtor may
annul a sale to the creditor-adjudicatee on the same grounds that
could have been used to prevent the sale, the courts of appeal have
been in disagreement.
In Doherty v. Randazzo, ° heirs of the deceased mortgagor sued
62. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2721.
63. Id. art. 2331; LA. R.S. 43:203 (Supp. 1960), as amended.
64. Carmack v. Buckner, appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
65. Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973).
66. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 2631.
67. Id. arts. 2635-37; Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d
305 (1954); Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884).
68. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 2642, 2751.
69. See, e.g., Reid v. Federal Land Bank, 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939);
McDonald v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 178 La. 645, 152 So. 318 (1933); Ring v.
Schilkoffsky, 158 La. 361, 104 So. 115 (1925).
70. 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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to annul the sale under executory process on the grounds of insuffi-
cient authentic evidence i.e., lack of certification by the clerk of court
of the copy of the mortgage presented to the trial court. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, relying on dictum in an earlier Louisiana
supreme court case," held that the mortgagor could attack the sale
on the grounds of insufficient authentic evidence since the property
remained in the hands of the mortgagee-adjudicatee. The court rea-
soned that the mortgagee knew of the defect and was responsible for
it. This result and reasoning was followed in Tapp v. Guaranty Fi-
nance Co." where the mortgagor was allowed to annul the sale on the
grounds of lack of authentic evidence of the endorsement of the note
to the defendant who had enforced it through executory process. In
Powell v. Carter," the court allowed a third possessor to annul a sale
under executory process on the grounds of a lack of authentic evi-
dence of the transfer of the notes to the plaintiff in the executory
proceeding. But in Jam bois 0. & M. Machine Shop Inc. v. Dixie Mill
Supply Co. ," the Fourth Circuit refused to annul the sale under exe-
cutory process, at least as to the property still in the hands of the
mortgagee-adjudicatee, where the attack was based on the lack of
evidence showing that the corporation had authorized its president
to execute the note and mortgage which was the basis for the execu-
tory proceeding. The court based its decision, in part, on the fact that
the corporation had unconditionally accepted proceeds from the sale
and thus could not later attack it. But it also relied on the fact that
the mortgagor had notice of the proceeding and had not tried to stop
the sale through an injunction or suspensive appeal and it is this
reasoning which puts the case in conflict with Tapp, Doherty and
Powell. Finally, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herron," the court rea-
soned that it was not necessary for the creditor in an executory pro-
ceeding to present evidence in the form of a verified petition or affida-
vit that the debtor has failed to pay the obligation, because there is
a presumption that no payments have been made other than those
shown by the pleadings. Any defense of payment must be asserted
through an injunction proceeding or by a suspensive appeal to pre-
vent the sale. If it is not, the defense is considered abandoned or
waived. The court's reasoning was dictum because the note showed
on its face that it was past due and unpaid. However, the Herron
71. Viley v. Wall, 154 La. 221, 97 So. 409 (1923).
72. 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), noted in 24 LA. L. REV. 894 (1964).
73. 233 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
74. 218 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
75. 234 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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decision implies that even if the note does not on its face reveal the
unpaid debt and the creditor does not show the breach of the obliga-
tion by means of a verified petition or affidavit as required by article
2637, the debtor would not be able to use the defect to attack the
validity of the executory proceeding after the sale of the property but
would be limited to an injunction or suspensive appeal to prevent the
sale.
To resolve this conflict the Louisiana supreme court granted cer-
tiorari in Reed v. Meaux,"6 where the trial court and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal had dismissed the mortgagor's suit to annul the sale
in executory process based on, among other grounds, the failure to
show the proper party defendant and the necessity for appointing an
attorney to represent the defendants through either a verified petition
or affidavit. The supreme court, on rehearing, affirmed. The court
drew a distinction between facts which must be shown by authentic
evidence-the mortgage or privilege containing the confession of
judgment, the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage
or privilege and the creditor's right to use executory process-and
facts which may be shown by verified petition, supplemental petition
or by affidavit. The former requirements are substantive; they must
be shown by authentic evidence and a failure to do so renders the
proceeding void. On the other hand, defects with respect to proof of
the proper party defendant or of the necessity for the appointment
of an attorney are defects of form which may be used to prevent the
seizure and sale either through an injunction or a suspensive appeal
but may not be used to annul a sale even if the property remains in
the hands of the mortgagee-adjudicatee.
Reed makes it clear that a sale through executory process can be
attacked only for defects which affect the fundamental nature of the
executory proceeding, basically those matters which must be proven
by authentic evidence." But the opinion necessarily raises the ques-
tion whether the same distinction applies when the debtor attempts
to use defects in the executory proceeding as a defense to an action
by the creditor for a deficiency judgment. In League Central Credit
Union v. Montgomery,"8 the defendant argued that the executory
proceeding, which was the basis for the plaintiff's action for a defi-
ciency judgment, was null because the mortgage was not in authentic
form but had merely been acknowledged by the mortgagee's agent.
The defendant's position was that the creditor is entitled to a defi-
76. 262 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), aff'd 292 So. 2d 557 (La. 1974).
77. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2635.
78. 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. Rlv. 405 (1969).
[Vol. 35
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 459
ciency judgment if the property has been sold with legal appraise-
ment, but if the executory proceeding is null it cannot serve as the
basis for a valid sale with appraisement. In support of this position,
the defendant relied primarily on the Tapp decision,7" in which the
court allowed the debtor to annul a deficiency judgment because
there was no authentic evidence of the endorsement of the note on
which the executory proceeding was based. The plaintiff argued it
was too late for the defendant to question the validity of the executory
proceeding because he had failed to raise his challenge through an
injunction or suspensive appeal before the sale, relying on White
Motor Co. v. Piggy Bak Cartage Corp.80 In White, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal refused to allow the debtor to annul a deficiency
judgment on the ground of insufficient authentic evidence (no au-
thentic evidence of the authority of the president of mortgagor corpo-
ration to execute the chattel mortgages), reasoning that to allow such
attacks on the validity of an executory proceeding would affect the
stability of all sales under executory process, even though the debtor
was not seeking the return of the property. The Louisiana supreme
court in League Central chose to follow Tapp, rejecting White Motor
Co., on the ground that a decision to refuse a deficiency judgment
because of an invalid executory proceeding will not affect the validity
of the sale made under executory process. The defects in League
Central and Tapp would be classified as substantive under Reed and
so, under their facts, the cases are in harmony.
Thus, if there is a defect of a fundamental nature the defendant
in an executory proceeding can sue to annul the sale where the prop-
erty remains in the hands of the mortgagee-adjudicatee and can also
defeat or annul an action for a deficiency judgment. But where there
are only defects of form, the debtor cannot annul the proceedings and
it is not altogether clear whether he can use these defects to defeat a
deficiency judgment. The general reasoning is that a creditor is enti-
tled to a deficiency judgment if the property has been sold with valid
appraisement, but a null order for executory process cannot serve as
the basis for a legal appraisal and sale. Therefore, it could be argued
that if the executory proceeding were not null but only defective in
form, it could serve as the basis for a valid sale with appraisement
and it is reasonable to expect a debtor with notice to assert his defen-
ses through a suspensive appeal or injunction before the sale. But in
his concurring opinion Justice Tate reads the majority opinion in
79. See note 72 supra.
80. 202 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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Reed as not intending "to modify the holding in League Central
Credit Union v. Montgomery . . . that any defect in the executory
proceedings can be used as a defense to a deficiency judgment (as
contrasted with serving as a ground to set aside a sale)."8' This posi-
tion finds support in the strong public policy in favor of protecting
the debtor when the creditor employs the harsh remedy of executory
process and later seeks a deficiency judgment.
81. Reed v. Meaux, 292 So. 2d 557, 574 (La. 1974) (Tate, J., concurring).
